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The politics of invasion and alliance 
What should the political priority and relation be between cultural member-
ship, economic concerns and being a citizen of a state? I argue that indivi-
dualism, economism, and nationalism all harbour the danger of hierarchis-
ing these goals with the consequential invasion or even exclusion of one 
another. I describe both ethnic and state nationalists as using identity to 
monopolise political concerns. But state or cultural identity is also colonised 
or marginalised by either individualist or economistic politics. As alternative 
to invasion politics, I firstly propose that humans should be seen as 
negotiating with their embedding communities a plurality of identities that 
reflect a variety of transcendental ways of being human. These identities 
should then be acknowledged as equal ingredients in the empowerment 
and make-up of a blossoming human life. The variety of identities should 
therefore be developed in alliance with each other instead of being the 
victim of a strategy of mutual invasion or exclusion. 
1. Introduction 
For South Africa the 1990s was an intense and sometimes traumatic 
process of change. In a survey of Idasa (Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for South Africa) as reported in Rapport of 29 October 2000, it 
was found that an increasing number of people evaluate the old 
apartheid  system  as  better  than the current one1. However, on a direct 
                                           
1 The numbers increased from 8% to 17% for blacks, 39% to 59% for whites, 11% to 
41% for coloureds, 13% to 56% for Indians. 
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question whether they want to return to apartheid, the majority still rejects 
such a possibility2. In an explanation of these confusing results, Idasa 
points out that greater political freedom does not mean increasing 
economic benefits. People are therefore prepared to tolerate a stronger 
totalitarian government if this will bring economic well-being. To this 
picture we can add that all South Africans will confirm a heightened 
consciousness of race and the difference between African and European 
culture. The differences between cultures and race seem to overlap with 
economic classes when Thabo Mbeki recently remarked bitterly that 
South Africa still consists of two nations, one black and poor and the 
other white and rich. To remedy the situation he proposes an African 
Renaissance; a call which is sometimes interpreted to mean a restoration 
of the genius of African culture. My impression is that this interpretation is 
met with indifference by the European section of the population. Even the 
idea of this Renaissance as a constitutional and economic modernisation 
of Africa is not taken seriously by European South Africans. Moreover, at 
least one ethnic group, the Afrikaners, are nervous about cultural survival 
and are sometimes even in despair about survival in the broadest sense. 
The rest of the country on the other hand, seems to be indifferent to and 
even irritated by the demands for survival from the former oppressors in 
the face of black poverty. 
It is this interrelation of civic, economic and cultural interests and 
apathies that present itself to me as subject for philosophical reflection. It 
is a reflection on political priorities, for politics is, according to Klop (1996: 
315), the acquisition of power (by for instance political parties) to 
influence (and, we can add, prioritise) the goals that the state pursues. It 
is therefore significant that the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor 
(1994b:25) gives his well-known essay on the multicultural condition the 
title “The Politics of Recognition”, which suggests that this condition 
should be politically important. Richard Rorty (1999:234) on the other 
hand, claims that the multicultural debate should not be politically 
significant, at least not as significant as the economic debate. I will 
mainly argue against the latter viewpoint and for the notion of an equality 
of loyalties to, concerns over, and relations between the identities given 
to the self by the societal spheres in which she is embedded. I will 
especially argue against the invasion of culture by identities like civic 
affairs (state identity) or economic concerns. The invasion of state 
identity or economic rights by culture is of course equally reprehensible. 
We should rather pursue a politics of entwinement that leaves separate 
                                           
2 A return to apartheid was only supported by 13% blacks, 23% coloureds, 31% whites, 
and 49% Indians. 
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identities like that of cultural membership and being a citizen relatively 
intact. In other words, I will argue that the alliance between identities that 
remains relatively sovereign, empowers the whole self to lead a fuller 
and more human life. 
2. Invasion politics 
2.1 Nationalism 
How do multicultural politics envision the inter-relation of 
identities? 
One of its main claims is that loyalty to the state will fade if it does not 
show sensitivity for the other identities of its citizens. There is, in other 
words, a form of connection, interaction and overlap between our civic 
and other identities3. I will argue that this idea constitutes a truly politics 
of alliance only if it implies an interlacement of a plurality of identities. 
Taylor (1994a:10-13) argues along similar lines. He sees classical 
patriotism as a commitment to the polity purely because of the justice of 
its laws. Nationalism in distinction, is a civic commitment that goes 
through some extra-civic identity like a language culture. This implies for 
instance that the polity cannot simply assume universalised patriotism 
but it must be tailored to the particularity of the citizens. In this form, 
nationalism functions as the fuel for modern patriotism. Taylor points out 
that this connection between civic and extra-civic identities can also be 
used against the politics of difference in order to homogenise a divided 
citizenry. In this case of civic invasion of identities, a narrative is created 
to give a homogeneous extra-political identity to a fragmented country 
that is supposed to unite the differences to ensure civic unity. Taylor 
(1994b:44, 46-51) describes the latter strategy by mentioning what I want 
to call the state nationalism propagated by Jean Jacques Rousseau. 
Rousseau motivated the idea of equal honour for all citizens by saying 
that this equal honour is created by a common purpose. However, says 
Taylor, the idea of a single common goal for all ended in the tyrannising 
homogenisations from the Jacobins up to the totalitarian regimes of the 
twentieth century. The important point against the state nationalism 
Taylor describes here, is that an obsession with a common goal for a 
state tends to exclude or downplay all other goals. State nationalism thus 
goes astray when it attempts to elevate a person’s civic identity to the 
                                           
3 Cf. for instance the arguments of De Dijn (1997:154-155), Kymlicka (1997:24) and 
Marshall (1995:519-520). 
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position of control identity4 and usually allies it with a single extra-civic 
goal that supposedly unifies all communal life. 
Because of the latter obsession state nationalists see the demand for a 
politics of difference as an attempt to divide the state and feel threatened 
by any politics of a plurality of extra-civic demands on the state. 
However, this is to ignore the implied acknowledgement of difference 
politics that civic and other identities, although relatively autonomous in 
relation to each other, cannot but be allied because the demand for 
recognising a plurality of identities is actually a demand for inclusion in 
the functioning of the state5. The homogenising model (state nationalism) 
assumes that a combination of the civic and a single extra-civic identity 
(state goal) invades all human functions. It tries to control (as far as 
possible) the entire lives of its citizens in order to make civic life as 
simple and as manageable as possible. A related attempt is that of 
cultural and ethnic nationalism6, which move in the direction of seeing a 
specific cultural identity to be of such overarching importance that it 
starts to invade the civic and all other identities of persons and 
communities to ensure a homogeneous cultural functioning. In this 
instance, we end up with the isolation and discrimination politics of ethnic 
cleansing, discrimination and separatism7. 
2.2 Structural and directional identities 
A plurality and relative independence of identities thus seems important. 
But this can lead to struggle politics. An instance of such a conflict is 
given by Taylor (1994a:17-19, 24) when he says that nationalism, multi-
                                           
4 Gutmann (1994:6) objects quite correctly to the idea of citizenship as a 
“comprehensive universal identity”; people see themselves, and are publicly 
recognised as nothing more than equal citizens. 
5 Cf. the critique of Habermas (1994:133-135) and Houston (1997:1-3, 6) in this regard 
on the arguments of state nationalists. 
6 I use the concept of cultural nationalism in order to distinguish it from a related kind of 
nationalism. Ethnic nationalism can, according to Kymlicka (1997:19-20, 27) be 
defined as loyalty to a nation that is defined by a common race or descent. Cultural 
groups in distinction do not restrict membership to those who share a common ethnic 
descent. 
7 Wolterstorff (1995:210-211) describes this “revenge of the particular” as part of the 
decline of modernism. Because the “ethos of liberalism” (i.e. “its values, its habits, its 
attitudes”) is becoming constantly “thinner in content”, its “grip on the citizenry” will 
become “ever more tenuous”. In other words, liberalism is not able to compete with 
“the emotional attachment” that particular identities are creating in the outlook of many 
people. 
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cultural politics, feminism, fundamentalist religions and the struggle 
against racism often compete for the same space8 of what he refers to 
as “categorical identity”. It is important to explain this struggle for the 
same space. For this purpose it is useful to employ the distinction 
(popular in reformational circles9) between the structure and direction of 
reality. This distinction implies that directional plurality cannot portray the 
same co-existence of identities as is the case with structural plurality; 
directional identities harbour an inherent propensity for collision. It is 
important to emphasise that what makes directional phenomena, among 
other things, directional is their attempt to monopolise the entire human 
condition; it cannot allow any other identity to compete with it about the 
direction of life. Thus, if nationalism, feminism and multiculturalism are 
struggling for the same space, we can suspect them to have become 
directional phenomena. 
Taylor (1985:34-35; 1989:27-30, 63; 1991:47; 1994b:33-34) indeed gives 
a directional function, content and place to identity as such. He sees 
identity as about a person’s stance towards the good as it is found in this 
person’s background framework of, significantly, strong evaluations10 
and commitments. The function of identity is therefore to give direction to 
his or her actions. Furthermore, this meaning of identity can for Taylor 
include spiritual or cultural identities. This implies that a particular culture 
can be a directional good if it functions as a horizon of meaning for  
our actions (Gutmann,1994:4-5; Taylor,1995:136-138, 140). The crucial 
question is whether such a culture becomes our identity in a totalitarian 
way, whether it becomes our control identity? But cultural phenomena do 
not necessarily need to be seen as directional in the sense of colonising 
the whole identity of a person (Griffioen,1995a:218; 1995b:153). 
Does Taylor see identity only in a directional meaning? I do not think so 
because he also sees culture as part of a structural (and not directional) 
plurality of identities. An important Taylorian (Taylor, 1989:28-31) distin-
                                           
8 Arab nationalism for instance had to make space for “Islam integrism” and Soviet 
Marxism made space for “virulent nationalisms”. 
9 Cf. for instance the analyses of Griffioen (1995a:205, 216-218, 220, 222). I believe his 
distinctions are based on Dooyeweerd’s (1979:7-8) notion of an endless religious 
dialectic in distinction to an aspectual dialectic that comes to rest when each aspect 
finds its proper place. 
10 Flanagan (1990:48-50) denies Taylor’s idea that identity is primarily created by strong 
evaluation. He thinks it is enough to identify “powerfully with one’s desires” or 
superficially with some “style or fashion” to have an identity. Flanagan nevertheless 
contradicts himself when he also thinks that an identity crisis is caused by some 
thoroughgoing problem with seeing the meaning of life. 
The politics of invasion and alliance  
182 Koers 66(3) 2001:177-196 
tion is that between transcendental moral questions and their contingent 
answers (identities) situated in the horizon of meaning. In a reinterpre-
tation of the Taylorian concept of identity, I want to see it as a nominal 
concept that actually comprises of a plurality of co-existent identities. We 
can call these identities contextualised functional identities since they are 
the local answers to transcendental questions about what might be the 
structure for the various functional dimensions of our lives. There should 
in principle not be any struggle for the same space between the various 
functional identities since they are the products of a variety of transcen-
dental questions, which differentiated over time into relative autonomous 
aspects of the human condition. It should also be possible here to talk 
about co-existent identities within the same function or categorical space. 
The variety of cultures and even sub-cultures or dialects within the same 
culture or language11 are for instance a contextual plurality that need not 
be in conflict. 
The metaphors of an invading, colonising or control identity refers to any 
identity-component that tries to be sovereign over all aspects of life12. 
“Invasion” or “colonisation” are negative concepts while “control” maybe 
a bit more positive. The positive evaluation for the existence of a control 
identity is based on reformational philosophy’s centring of our funda-
mental and directional religious condition or relation with God; this is our 
Christian identity. This however, also makes it clear that not any one of 
our contextualised functional identities can be our control identity. When 
dealing with proper functional and contextual identities, we should thus 
start off with a plural model where the various functional identities do not 
try to invade and control one another. 
2.3 The thin border for a thin identity 
To realise a non-conflictual structural and contextual plurality of identities 
is nevertheless not the easiest task. Nationalism is for instance not bad 
when it behaves within the limits of this plurality. Nationalism defined as 
loyalty to a particular culture or national state that assumes the position 
of control identity is, however, quite a different matter. Taylor (1994a:25-
                                           
11 Van der Merwe (1999:324) observes that cultural differences are between, as well as 
inside, cultural communities. This means “individuals and groups belong to multiple 
communities that demand recognition of different differences”, or “community-
constituting differences”. 
12 With this metaphor I have in mind what Dooyeweerd (1969:159) warns us against, 
namely that “the structural relation between the different aspects of an individual 
whole cannot be viewed as a mutual encroachment of one modal function upon the 
modal spheres of others”. 
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261;1994b:52-53, 59-61, 63-64) therefore correctly rejects radical ethnic 
nationalism and demands that it be curbed by a liberalism that gives 
equal citizenship to all, despite the particular identities that instigate 
nationalism. But this sets the scene for a tension between nationalism 
and classic liberal values, which claim to be blind to sentiments that 
emphasise difference13. This, however, is a tension that Taylor thinks 
can be managed without sacrificing the so-called universal liberties of 
individuals. 
Critics14 however, are not convinced by the notion that we can manage 
the tension between the politics of difference and difference-blindness. 
They mistrust Taylor’s multicultural discourse and suggest that it will 
develop into an obsession with some particular identity that eventually 
will take over the role of control identity. This flirtation with particularism, 
so the argument goes, will stereotype people and compel them to give 
more attention to one identity component than they need to. They there-
fore cannot see anything more than a very thin border between the 
justified recognition of some identity component and being enclosed in 
that component15. These critics seem onto something in the sense that 
an identity that invades more space than its own actually disempowers in 
its will to power16; it disempowers the identities it colonises and thus the 
self as a comprehensive entity. But the affirmation of some identity 
nevertheless cannot be denied. Kymlicka (1997:24,37-39) very clearly 
articulates this delicate sense when he argues that what he sees as 
cultural identity in the modern context is “very thin” because it comprises 
almost entirely of only language and allows “differences in religion, 
                                           
13 Laforest (1993:x) comments that Taylor’s thinking about nationalism is that of the 
“median way between extremes in accordance with the parameters of Aristotelian 
ethics”. Fellow Canadian, Will Kymlicka (1997:14-15), makes observations about the 
difference between nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland and Puerto 
Rico on the one hand, and the Balkan on the other, that confirm Taylor’s notion of the 
possibility of a liberal nationalism. 
14 Cf. the critical remarks of Appiah (1994:162-163), Lötter (1998:180), Rockefeller 
(1994:87-89) and Wolf (1994: 76-77). 
15 Oakes (1993:3) points out that these arguments take the ambiguous position that the 
political downplay of particular identities does not mean that these identities can be 
ignored. 
16 This intuition is confirmed in Wolterstorff (1983:104,108) and Goudzwaard’s (1984:39-
41) reformational explanation of the origin of nationalism as the self-curing response 
of a group to a perceived injustice. Wolterstorff (1983:108-109) and Goudzwaard 
(1984:42-44) indicate the danger when this nationalism does not exhaust itself in its 
curing function. Then the restoration of an ethnic identity develops into a destructive 
preoccupation with itself. 
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personal values, family relationships or lifestyle choices” (which is of 
course also cultures in themselves). He nevertheless emphasises that 
while cultural identity nowadays is very thin, “it is far from trivial” and that 
attempts to homogenise people are often met with serious resistance. 
The thin line between the empowerment of a thin identity and the power 
mongering of an imperialistic identity emphasises the need for the 
recognition of the separate and equal empowerments of the plurality of 
identities. If this plurality of empowerments is not recognised, people will 
constantly be the object of disempowerment in the direction of either the 
overemphasis, or non-recognition of some identity component. 
2.4 Economic invasion 
To add to the broader picture about the nature and extent of invasion 
politics, we should note that not only nationalism (and thus culture and 
the state) functions as an invasion force to be reckoned with in politics. A 
popular invader of the space for both cultural and civic identities is 
economic concerns17. An important exponent of this kind of politics is 
Rorty, who wants us to focus on economic reform to the neglect of the 
politics of difference. 
The politics of difference sometimes claim that a “new world economic 
order” is dependent on the creation of a “new world cultural order” 
(Balslev,1991:62, 68). Rorty (1991:77-79, 86-89) does not agree and 
argues that the only change towards economic equality will come once 
all capital is no longer concentrated in the West. The question of cultural 
otherness, he says, is therefore not relevant to the question of the poor 
Third World on how to get economic resources more evenly distributed. 
Rorty nevertheless undermines this stark materialistic viewpoint when he 
points to cultural and religious value systems like the Calvinist view of 
predestination and Indian or Japanese caste systems that keep the poor 
down. He accordingly also argues for a Western-style secular worldview 
to assist the change to a new world economic order. Rorty in other 
words, cannot but acknowledge some influence from the self-image and 
                                           
17
 Some development theorists and Third World leaders, according to De Vries 
(1990:165, 174, 176) justify the violation of human rights in order to achieve a high 
rate of economic growth. However, says De Vries, economic concerns cannot justify 
extremities like mass arrests, expulsions, abductions, murder, rape and forced 
starvation. More importantly, De Vries makes a basic point I also want to use 
concerning the relation between culture and economics. He namely says that 
“economic rights should not take priority over political rights, but rather are or can be 
interactive and reinforcing”. 
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world-view embedded in our cultural and religious traditions on the 
economic situation a person finds herself in. 
Despite this discrepancy, he insists that economic concerns should take 
priority in politics. Rorty (1998a:76-81, 84-91;1999:231-234) argues that 
the older (American) reformist Left saw the prime social sin as that of 
selfishness, which manifests itself in a relentless capitalism. In recent 
decades, however, the postmodern cultural Left has come to see this 
position as unable to solve another crime, sadism (i.e. to misrecognise a 
person’s identity) through economic means. Although the struggle 
against sadism has had some success, the selfishness of the capitalistic 
cosmopolitan (globalising) elite is again on the rise. For Rorty this is a 
sign that we cannot focus on both the politics of economic equality and 
the politics of difference. He warns that the evil of selfishness will not 
fade simply because sadism is opposed. In other words, he seems not to 
believe in the notion of an automatic causal relation between the two 
forms of evil. He therefore concludes that we need a return to a leftist or 
reformist economic politics and a renewed resistance to selfishness. 
This, he says, should be done by a globalised reformist Left and a global 
polity, which focus mainly on economic issues18. 
There is, nevertheless, in Rorty’s approach to focus on selfishness the 
same one-sidedness that he too identifies with the cultural Left who 
wants to deal with only sadism in the hope that in some miraculous way 
this will also solve the problems of selfishness.19 There is indeed a 
reciprocal relation between selfish people and sadists in the sense that a 
sadist can use selfishness to be cruel and a selfish person will find it 
easy to sadistically shrug off the economic needs of the culturally other. 
But the problems of the two groups are not necessarily or mechanistically 
connected. It is therefore better, as Rorty (1998c:8; 1999:234-237) half-
heartedly also acknowledges, to reject the notion of automatic causality 
and combat sadism as well as selfishness in a joint operation on both 
fronts of the political war against cruelty. It is important to note that, 
despite this concession, Rorty still sees political bodies to be actively 
involved in equalising the economic survival of people. This active role is 
not true of his view of equalising the chances of survival of other 
                                           
18 It is interesting to note how the same disengagement between economy and culture 
takes place in the conservative criticism of Horowitz (1998:3-4) on Rorty who, 
although he disagrees with Rorty’s economic views, also thinks this is where the focus 
should be. 
19
 Maas (1999:3) indeed accuses Rorty of falling into the same trap that he thinks the 
cultural Left has fallen into. 
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identities20. Although the later Rorty is nearing the view that economic 
and cultural politics should form an alliance, he still leaves the door open 
for economic concerns to colonise politics, and in the end our other 
identities too. 
3. Alliance politics 
The latter suggestion of an alliance indicates that we should go further 
than a mere rejection of the politics of invasion. It should actually be 
noted that the impulse to invade is based on a very basic ontological 
truth, namely that we live in a universe where all that exists are 
interlaced21. To explain how this interlacement is attained we can 
mention Dooyeweerd’s (1969:628-630, 632-633, 636-639) concept of 
enkapsis. He sees it as alternative to firstly the universalist view that the 
relation between societal spheres should be that of a metaphysical 
organic whole to its parts. But enkapsis also implies the alternative to 
another popular concept of interaction, namely the atomistic and 
mechanist view which identifies the universe with a natural scientific 
system of elementary physical causal relations. To explain enkapsis 
Dooyeweerd uses the example of a tree. A tree cannot be seen as a 
completely independent isolated substance, nor does it function thus. It is 
clear that the tree will not be able to escape the cosmic coherence 
between the tree and its environment (Umwelt). Dooyeweerd (1969:636) 
therefore describes enkapsis as “an interwovenness of individuality-
structures”. It is important to note that the “enkaptically interwoven thing 
with an independent individuality structure of its own is influenced by this 
union with another thing only in such a way that the interwoven thing 
maintains its internal structural law” (Dooyeweerd, 1969:639). This 
means that especially whole-part relations are evaded in this respect 
because upholding the individuality structures and separate leading 
function of the intertwining things in the enkaptic structure safe-guards 
the relative autonomy of the connecting things. The plural model for 
identity will have to be complemented with this notion of enkapsis or, 
what I want to call in the context of multiculturalism, a politics of alliance. 
In other words, we need a view of our identity as an enkapsis of identities 
given to us by the variety of societal spheres to which we belong.  
                                           
20 Habermas (1994:107-109) also categorises both economic and cultural issues as 
politically important. In the case of identity politics, however, Habermas too is not sure 
that marginalised cultures need guarantees of survival. 
21 Cf. Griffioen’s (1995a:220-225) emphasis on the relative autonomy but simultaneous 
coherence of the variety of structures of society. 
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3.1 Economy in alliance 
Taylor seems to be onto this enkaptic trail when he does not, like Rorty, 
give economic reform an almost indisputable primacy and thus assumes 
that it will automatically originate a fair dispensation for our cultural 
identities. He is in fact less univocal in his general strategy towards moral 
dilemmas than Rorty and tries to accommodate a plurality of moral ideals 
to motivate cultural, economic and political practices. Taylor (1991:11-12, 
22-23, 94-107) is, for instance, not one-sidedly pessimistic or optimistic 
about the impact of cultural practices like individualism, subjectivism, or 
instrumental reason and technology on our civilisation. He argues that if 
we identify and retrieve the moral ideals behind these practices, we will 
be able to give alternative moral frames in which we can see them and 
which will bring out the better manifestation of these practices. He 
acknowledges for instance that the popular ideals for instrumental reason 
are dominance and a kind of disengaged freedom. But, he says, the 
benevolent aim of relieving suffering should also play an important role in 
motivating instrumental reason. It means, he says, that we are facing a 
never-ending struggle between dominance and benevolence in which we 
should never allow dominance to get the upper hand in practising 
instrumental reason. It is this strategy to see a multitude of moral ideals 
behind our political practices, which Taylor also employs in his attempt to 
give the politics of difference some priority. 
Rorty portrays the need for economic equality as a kind of “iron cage” 
argument against difference politics; we are inescapably forced to give 
economic arguments and concerns primacy. Taylor acknowledges that 
identity politics do not have the aim of bringing about a difference blind 
equality, as is the case with economic reform (Taylor, 1994b:39-40). 
However, in addition to the equality ideal, Taylor also observes an 
important common moral ideal behind economic and identity politics. 
Taylor (1994a:14-15; 1995:281) points out that in both cases the legiti-
macy of democracy is under threat because a section of the population 
feels ignored. He therefore thinks that recognition measures are needed 
to deal with the sense of marginalisation of the poor as well as a cultural 
minority. The democratic ideal of giving all an effective hearing (recog-
nition) thus points in the direction of an alliance between civic and 
economic, as well as between civic and cultural concerns. 
Taylor is nevertheless sensitive not to implement alliances with the 
disguised aim of invasion. I have in mind for instance the distortions of 
invasion when economic concerns join forces with only a person’s civic 
identity to form state nationalism. According to Taylor (1994a:1-6, 13-14) 
this takes place in the argument that a modernising economy demands 
from the state a linguistically homogenised citizenry that can easily be 
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relocated to where economic activity takes place22. For Taylor (1994a:5-
6, 13-14) this functionalist argument is incomplete. If a certain section 
does not abide by the cultural homogenisation, strife will be inherent to 
that state. In this case, multicultural provisions (e.g. multilinguality) would 
be a more “economic” solution. A distortion towards the opposite of 
cultural and even ethnic homogenisation is also possible. Economic 
safety and security are usually the main issues that instigate the ethnic 
nationalism of the lower economic classes (Taylor, 1993:21-22; 1994a: 
19-21). Although this seems like the opposite of the unholy invading 
alliance between state nationalism and economic empowerment, it is the 
same kind of colonising politics. In the first case, cultural identity is 
confronted with a struggle on two fronts, against state nationalism and 
economism. In the latter case, the civic identity is invaded by a 
combination of ethnic and economic politics. 
However, if we read Taylor (1993:3-5, 8,10; 1994a:15-16, 25) carefully 
there is another possibility, one that stands for a plurality of ideals with 
the potential to evade invasion politics. He gives the example of the 
professional elite of francophone Quebec for whom non-recognition of 
their identity is the important cause of nationalistic sentiments. This 
nationalism is not a traditionalism, and is prepared to modernise (and 
presumably also to reform economic policy). It is, however, not prepared 
to be culturally engulfed by a modernisation that annihilates all inherited 
identity traits. This nationalism thus operates with a “call-to-differ” in the 
process of change towards a modern economic situation. For Taylor this 
is to rely partially on one’s cultural tradition to carry one into the new 
practices23. This is an acknowledgement of the empowerment connected 
to being embedded in a cultural tradition. It can of course happen that 
Taylor’s formulation falls out in the direction of a kind of national-
socialism24 that can be misused by populism or ethnicism. To counter 
this, we will have to constantly keep in mind that we should implement an 
interlacement of a variety of identities given to us by social structures that 
                                           
22 Kymlicka (1997:28) adds that national governments also want a common culture to 
promote “social equality and political cohesion”. 
23 Kymlicka (1997:33-34) affirms this sense when he explains why many staunch 
nationalists nowadays are also liberal reformers. He argues that people participate in 
social practices when they agree with the meanings attached to it. But then they have 
to understand these meanings which are embedded in a shared vocabulary or culture. 
He therefore concludes that cultures are not valuable in themselves, but because they 
give us access to other social practices like that of being a citizen. 
24 Baier (1988:593) indeed thinks we get from Taylor some “form of decentralised 
socialism”. 
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each has its own structure and goal that need to be co-ordinated with the 
goals of other structures. This implies for instance that the main function 
of a person’s civic identity is about the social need to be treated equally 
and fairly – a need that should be administered by the state. But this 
function of the state cannot exist on its own; the entwinement between 
this function and the functions of other societal sphere assumes that it is 
the others that define the goals for equal treatment. It is in this sense that 
we can claim that patriotism goes through our extra-civic identities like 
economic status and cultural identity. 
3.2 Self-creation and authenticity 
It can thus be argued that we need an entwinement and co-operation 
between the identities we get from the various societal spheres in which 
we are embedded. But we need to be even more specific with this 
argument. We should also emphasise that we need an entwinement 
between our sense of individual identity and power, and the fact that we 
cannot have this sense without being embedded in communal societal 
spheres. The downgrading of the communal nature of identities is usually 
associated with the individualism of classic liberalism. 
Classic liberalism is portrayed as a less aggressive homogenising politics 
than the attempt by state nationalism to reduce all persons to their civic 
identities. Liberalism rejects the idea of a general collective will, goal and 
equalisation of all roles. It is only concerned with an equality of individual 
rights. It therefore looks sceptically towards state recognition of particular 
identities. Liberals usually regard this kind of recognition as a pretence to 
discriminate against individuals who do not fit into these particularities. It 
is important to note that this perspective argues from the assumption that 
our entire human identity is focused on individual autonomy; if some 
communal identity is favoured, the immediate liberal reaction is that the 
freedom of the individual to determine his own good is hampered (Taylor, 
1994b:51-57). Liberalism can nevertheless acknowledge the notion that 
identity is a configuration of diverse communal identities. This viewpoint 
seems even to reject the centring of one of these identities. It neverthe-
less wants people to individually create themselves by combining in an 
endless process their various possibilities for identity. For this to happen, 
individuals should be free from any form of communal pressure to 
conform to only one identity ideal. In fact, for liberals the ability to freely 
create oneself, must be the prominent part of everyone’s identity25. 
                                           
25 I here have in mind Lötter (1998:182, 184-186, 188, 194, 195) as a recent South 
African exponent of this liberal recognition. Kymlicka’s (1997:22, 34) advocacy of a 
liberal nationalism makes the same point. 
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This vision of plurality is nevertheless somewhat self-refuting for it seems 
to think a person should be free to choose/create her or his own identity 
except for not being free not to create him or herself. It is as if this liberal 
position foresees the self-creating ability as a substantial core behind the 
integration of the various identities and all actions that flow from these 
identities. This smacks of a new focusing of identity on the personal 
capacity for self-creation. The concern with individual creative freedom is 
probably a reaction to the communitarian obsession with communal 
identities. This evaluation nevertheless cannot avoid the centring of the 
self-creative individual that causes the atomistic situation where people 
always have to choose for individual autonomy as identity component 
and reject all communal identities. Liberalism thus is still in need of a 
view that would not put us before this kind of choice. 
Taylor (1989:28-29, 35-36; 1991:47-50, 66, 82;1994b:28-37) is seeking a 
way out of this dilemma between individual self-creation and communal 
formation with his use of the Romantic notion of authenticity. Authenticity 
emphasises the ability of individuals and cultural groups to connect 
inwardly with an own unique identity. For Taylor the concept of authen-
ticity is not a simple subjectivism and particularism since it also assumes 
external sources to reveal themselves inside the self or group. In fact, 
Taylor even claims that the sources of our authentic identities are for the 
larger part beyond the individual self. He has mainly the self’s conver-
sation with its community in mind, which means that the genesis as well 
as the maintenance of the self’s identity is dialogical. This implies, 
according to Gutmann (1994:6-7), among other things that disengage-
ment between individual self-creation and being informed by communal 
identities should never arise because people will always be partly 
created by the communities in which they are embedded. This view 
means the capacity for creation includes two moments, the personal as 
well as the communal or traditional. Neither of these should invade our 
entire creative ability but neither of them can be ignored in the process of 
culture creation. If the communal side is centred, we move in the 
direction of deviant forms of nationalism and socialism. If the personal 
empowerment for cultural action is centred, we end with the individualis-
tic attempt to self-create de novo. The only alternative, therefore, is that 
of co-operation. 
But the acknowledgement of the need for something beyond the indivi-
dual self in order to realise the ideal of self-creation is only the beginning 
of the Romantic story of authenticity. Despite his under-evaluation of 
difference, Rorty (1991:19-20, 78-80) mentions what he calls the 
Romantic “love of the exotic” (i.e. a yearning for difference or variety) that 
creates the conditions for “self-enhancement”. He agrees that exotic 
cultures keep alive in us alternative traditions of speaking and acting and 
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the fact that Western culture can be wrong on some things. He, 
nevertheless does not want a situation of fixed exotic differences. He 
claims that the pragmatic use of difference intends only a difference from 
what one is accustomed to. This means, according to Rorty, that 
differences in one’s own culture can be enough. The emphasis is on self-
enlargement and not on preserving some tradition, he says. Critics point 
out that this mild form of ethnocentrism portrays a dangerous self-
enclosement, which might also heighten conflict and misunderstanding 
(De Dijn, 1997:151, 156; Balslev, 1991:60-61). Rorty’s attempt to reduce 
differences to a mild sameness thus seems to refute the empowering 
purpose of authentic self-enhancement in the “love of the exotic” that he 
also claims to believe in. The important implication of this moment of self-
defeat in the thinking of Rorty underlines that the need for personal self-
enhancement cannot succeed without a co-existent and co-operative 
plurality of cultures. 
Cultural uniqueness as part of one’s self-identity should thus be added to 
answer the fundamental yearning for authenticity in human beings. The 
practical value of this yearning is that it creates the conditions for cross-
pollination between cultures26. We can also argue that cultural diversity 
serves as the condition of having alternatives against which one can 
measure the value of one’s own cultural identity and practices. Moderate 
Romantic arguments for cultural diversity thus make room for seeing an 
inseparable bond between non-homogenised cultures in order to pro-
mote self-enhancement. It is important that this alliance never transform 
itself into a homogenised force for then it will lack its true strength, that is 
variety that enables self-enhancement and -reform. 
3.3 Recognition and empowerment 
Taylor supports the communitarian correction to individualism but also 
rejects a purely communalistic formation of the self. He rather sees 
identity as moulded by the ongoing dialogue we have with others or our 
community. Taylor (1991:45-46, 50; 1994a:16-19; 1994b:25-26, 31, 36-
37, 64-66) argues that this dialogical condition of personhood has risen 
in prominence in modern times because of the collapse of given 
ontological and social hierarchies. To not have an inherited social identity 
causes the recognition of one’s identity by others to become increasingly 
important. We are seemingly at the point where Taylor is justified in 
putting forward a recognition thesis for modern politics. This thesis 
implies that a person’s identity is crucially formed by the mis/recognition 
                                           
26 Roodt (2000a:3-4; 2000b:1, 5) strongly emphasises (even overemphasises) this 
argument. 
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of others. It is said for instance that women who have internalised a 
picture of inferiority will not excel even when the objective obstacles to 
their advancement are removed. With reference to Franz Fanon’s 
rejection of the self-image of being colonised given by the colonisers, 
Taylor also points out that the non-recognition of a person or cultural 
group’s identity by others can cause a crippling self-hatred. Taylor 
(1993:10-13, 21; 1994b:64-66) furthermore explains the impact of non-
recognition with the example of the resurging nationalist sentiments 
among the professional elite of francophone Quebec. He argues that this 
elite will indicate inequality and exploitation as the main issues of their 
nationalism. Taylor, however, suggests that the issue is rather about the 
misrecognition that forges a demeaning identity27. 
With the latter explanation Taylor gives the impression to some28 that 
multiculturalism is not about the usual power issues but about a lesser 
issue of self-image and recognition of this image. Does this perception 
imply that we can underplay the importance of power by means of 
recognition politics? It is, however, important to observe the inequality of 
power relations between those who demand recognition and those from 
whom recognition is demanded. Taylor implicitly acknowledges this role 
of power in recognition politics when he points out that non-recognition 
can seriously harm the self-image of “the other” We therefore have to 
emphasise the fact that recognition of cultural identity asks for fairness in 
relations that are sensitive to the empowerment a good public image can 
give. Thus, the question is not whether identity is about power or not, but 
rather how we will eventuate a fair balance of power because both non-
recognition and overemphasising some identity will ultimately indicate a 
misuse of power. 
We should pause for a moment to ask a last fundamental question: What 
is the power connected to culture? First something about culture: Rorty 
(1998b:188) sees it as part of the contextualisation of human communi-
ties. It is something every army barrack, monastery, university and so on 
has. It is furthermore clear that all of us belong to a variety of cultures 
because all of us belong to more than one contextualised human 
                                           
27 Kymlicka (1997:14) also argues that because there are not any more statistically 
significant differences in income or wealth between francophones in Quebec and the 
anglophones, the only issue that drives francophone nationalism is a desire for 
recognition. He, nevertheless, acknowledges a lower income for francophones outside 
Quebec than that of anglophones. This, however, might indicate (but not for Kymlicka) 
a connection between cultural empowerment and economic empowerment. 
28 Nicholson (1996:4-7; 2-15) for instance argues that Taylor does not recognise power 
relations. 
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community. In this sense culture is indeed something that will necessarily 
manifest multi-culturally. We therefore see the emergence of diverse 
groups like language groups, feminists and religious groupings mobilising 
themselves for the recognition of their language, gender and religious 
cultures or identities. This brings me to the reason for the latter mobili-
sation for power. Rorty stumbles on something more than only a super-
ficial recognition of identity when he defines culture as a set of shared 
habits that enables the members of a contextualised community to get 
along with one another and their environment. According to this 
definition, culture is about power to deal with one’s circumstances. 
But power needs to be approached with care. The postmodern notion, 
which claims that all there is to being human and living with other 
humans is the will to power, needs to be rejected (Taylor, 1994b:68-71; 
Wolterstorff, 1995:213-214). However, this does not imply that legitimate 
power has nothing in common with something like our cultural way of 
being. In this regard, we can employ the less totalitarian and less brute 
concept of empowerment (i.e. investing someone with legal power). 
From the Dooyeweerdian tradition and others29, we learn that the cultural 
way of being is about empowering a person to control the world around 
him or her in a creative manner. Although this power is a personal 
possession, it is partly given also from inside a collective tradition that 
carries certain creative possibilities30. These two dimensions of culture 
seem to be reconcilable with Taylor’s dialogical condition and recognition 
thesis; this is the idea that an empowering identity is something we (as 
persons) negotiate with the community in which we are embedded. The 
point is, we are embedded in particular cultural identities which empower 
us to interact creatively with our surroundings. 
4. Conclusion 
It seems as if we can distinguish a historical evolvement or disclosure of 
at least three identity components we get from the societal spheres in 
which we are embedded. These three identify components have political 
importance in the modern world because of the empowerment they 
mediate.  
                                           
29 Together with Rorty (1998b:188), Kymlicka (1997:22) also says that a person’s 
cultural identity “provides the most important context within which people develop and 
exercise their autonomy”. 
30 The “personal and collective aspects of empowerment to creatively control the 
surrounding world” is my version of part of Dooyeweerd’s (1979:66-67, 70-71) 
explanation of the cultural aspect. 
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• The first is a demand that the state should recognise the equality of all 
human beings, all human aspects and all social dimensions and 
institutions before the law in distinction to the pre-modern social 
hierarchies.  
• This demand manifest itself secondly specifically in the recognition of 
the economic dignity and security of all human beings.  
• To this, we have to add the demand for the recognition of identities 
like culture, sexuality and so on, of persons.  
In the practical functioning of the modern world, the last two is because 
of the first, a demand to maximise equal economic means and the 
recognition of cultures. It implies a search for an economic and cultural 
condition of dignity and security for all human beings. In Rorty’s terms, it 
is a search for rising beyond selfishness and sadism. That these ideals 
are put against each other in practical politics is clear. Equality is seen by 
many as a universal demand while authenticity is seen as its particularist 
denial. Furthermore, the demand for economic integrity is seen by many 
as a more important need than the recognition of difference. This is the 
practical situation. I believe, however, that one of our modern political 
issues need to be that these demands should not, in a return of pre-
postmodern ontological stances, be hierarchised or centred with the 
concomitant suppression and dialectical backlash of some of these 
identities. They should rather be promoted as allied forces in the 
undertaking to disclose life’s full potential. 
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